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Remote electronic voting systems are more and more used - not so
much for parliamentary elections, but nevertheless for elections on lower levels as
in associations and at universities. In order to have a basis for the evaluation and
certification, in Germany a Common Criteria Protection Profile [PP08  is
developed, which defines basic requirements for remote electronic voting systems.
This Protection Profile requires a rather low evaluation depth (EAL2+). For
elections on higher levels an appropriate adjustment of the evaluation depth is
recommended. In its first part this paper points out that increasing the evaluation
depth beyond EAL5 is not possible at present, since EAL6 requires formal
methods and in particular a formal IT security model. Such a formal model does
not exist yet. In the second part, this paper proposes a first step to an IT security
model for remote electronic voting systems, which, however, considers only a
subset of the security objectives defined in the Protection Profile [PP08 .
Over the last two years, the Gesellschaft f r Informatik (GI – the German society of
computer scientists) has developed a Protection Profile (PP) for a basic set of security
requirements for remote electronic voting systems [PP08  in cooperation with the
Bundesamt f r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI – German Federal Office for
Information Security) and the German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence
(DFKI). The Protection Profile is based on the Common Criteria [CC06 . It defines a
minimum set of security objectives, which every remote electronic voting system has to
ensure and a set of assumptions to the environment, in which the system is used. A
remote electronic voting system certified against this Protection Profile [PP08  assures a
secret, free, equal and universal election only under the condition that the system is used
in an environment where the defined assumptions hold.
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The Common Criteria (CC) together with the Common Evaluation Methodology
[CEM06  define how the compliance of a particular system with the defined security
objectives has to be evaluated. The CC differentiates between different evaluation
depths. They distinguish between evaluation assurance level (EAL) 1 to 7+, whereby 7+
means the most intensive evaluation. Generally, the deeper this evaluation goes, the
higher is the trustworthiness into the certified system. The scope of the system to be
evaluated, the evaluation complexity, and the evaluation methods rise with rising EAL
level. The Protection Profile, which defines a basic set of security requirements for
remote electronic voting systems, requires the assurance level EAL2+ which is
characterised by the following aspects:
- Execution of independent and structured tests by the evaluator
- Analysis of the documentation up to the high-level design and the interface
specification
- Analysis of the strength of the functions
- Search for obvious vulnerabilities by the evaluator
- Presence of a configuration system
- Evidence of secure system delivery procedures
EAL2+ is certainly sufficient for elections in associations, schools and universities, but
not for elections on higher levels and in particular not for parliamentary elections. Thus,
for example, the persons in charge of the Protection Profile, which define requirements
for the digital election pen36 [PP06 37, require EAL3+38. Some critics demanded EAL4
and even higher.
36 The digital election pen had been planned for the citizenry election in Hamburg in February 2008.
37 The Protection Profile is based on the Common Criteria version 2.3.
38 The Protection Profile required EAL 3 augmented with the following components: ADV_SPM.1 (Informal
TOE security policy model) and AVA_MSU.3 (Analysis and testing for insecure states) - replacing
AVA_MSU.1.
187
In the past, systems have been predominantly evaluated according to evaluation
assurance levels equal or below EAL4+, since starting from the EAL5 semi-formal
and/or formal methods are required. The application of such methods causes substantial
additional effort for manufacturers and evaluators. The decision for such a high
evaluation assurance level should be made before starting the development because
(semi-)formal methods cannot be implemented in the follow-up (the effort to do so in the
follow-up is as large as a complete new development). However, EAL5 provides a
substantial increase in the trustworthiness of certified systems compared to EAL4,
because a semi-formal description of the system design as well as a more modular and
therefore better analysable architecture is demanded. A corresponding increase can be
identified from EAL5 to EAL6 because the semi-formal specification languages are
replaced by formal specification languages. ”Past experiences show that a formal
modelling of the security policies given as a formal security model may lead to an
increase of con dence in the security of the product that obeys these security policies.”
[DFKI02 
Starting from EAL6, the Common Criteria component ADV_SPM.1 has to be ensured,
which demands the use of a formal IT security model. Moreover, the component requires
a consistency proof (in form of a mathematical proof) for the model itself and a
compliance conformance between the system specification and the defined model. To do
so, it is possible to use already published and established formal IT security models39 as
a whole or in parts. If no suitable formal IT security model exists, such a model must be
developed.
The latter case holds for remote electronic voting systems. Therefore, such a formal IT
security model has to be developed before an evaluation according to EAL6 and/or 7 can
be aimed. In the context of this article we point out, by the example of some concrete
security objectives defined in the Protection Profile, how such a formal IT security
model can be designed.
In the further contribution, the definition of an IT security model is introduced (see
chapter 2), then it is discussed whether existing IT security models can be applied (see
chapter 3). Subsequently, security objectives from the Protection Profile are identified,
which are considered for the definition of a formal IT security model (see chapter 4), and
afterwards a formal IT security model is developed and proven to ensure all
characteristics of an IT security model (see chapter 5). The paper closes with the
proposal of future work activities and a short summery (see chapter 6).
39 Examples for available and established IT security models are: Bell/LaPadula model, the Clark Wilson
model, and the Biba model.
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. According to [Grimm08 , IT security models define system states
and state transitions, differentiate between secure and insecure states, and explain under
which circumstances secure states are reached. An IT security model can be more or less
formal. All IT security models contain the following five description elements:
1. The definition of a superior security objective
2. The specification of secure system states40 which represent together the superior
security objective
3. A trust model, describing a set of assumptions about the environment in which
the system is used and under which the set of secure system states is equivalent
to the superior security objective.
4. A set of permitted state transitions
5. A security theorem, claiming that applying any permitted state transitions to any
secure state necessarily transfers to a secure state again.
. An IT security model has to close the following two gaps:
- between the secure system states and the superior security objective (trust
model in 3) and
- between the permitted state transitions and the secure system states (security
theorem in 5).
For our purpose the first gap is already closed by the Protection Profile; in particular by
- the security problem definition, including a list of assumptions about the
environment,
- the list of security objectives for the system, and
- the discussions in section  security objective rationale“.
Therefore, this aspect is not further discussed in this paper. The second gap is closed by
the security theorem with its corresponding proof in sections 4 and 5 of this paper.
40 The specification of secure system states corresponds to the Common Criteria security objectives (in case of
a non formal IT security model).
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. The secure
states (description element 2) and the permitted state transitions (description element 4)
have to be described as accurately and precisely as possible. One informal way to
formulate secure states is the definition of security objectives according to the Common
Criteria [CC07 . In this case, the security theorem (description element 5) is proven by a
linguistically convincing and conclusive argumentation. For applications which require a
high security assurance, the definitions of a secure state and of permitted state transitions
must be consistent and the corresponding security theorem must hold without any doubt.
In this case, it is necessary to specify the secure states and the permitted state transitions
in a formal way, and the security theorem must be proven with mathematical means. The
formal specification of both together (in description elements 2 and 4) together with the
formal proof (in description element 5) represents a formal IT security model 1.
In the case of a formal IT security model, a third gap has to be closed - the gap between
the linguistically formulated security objectives from the Protection Profile and the
formal specification of the secure states. This cannot be formalised, but this is the subject
of an argumentative discourse of security and application experts.
The application of formal IT
security models has three main advantages:
- No natural language can guarantee an unambiguous interpretation and,
therefore, it provides no feasibility to prove consistence in the formulation of secure
states and permitted state transitions. Vulnerabilities in the implementation of these are a
consequence. In contrast, the application of mathematical established technical
equipment, which makes the application of computer-aided proofs possible, enables the
definition of unambiguous and inter-subjective secure states and permitted state
transitions.
- The development of a formal IT security model is used to identify and remove
inconclusive, inconsistent, contradictory, or not enforceable secure states and/or
permitted state transitions which cannot be detected with natural language.
- Using natural language for the specification of secure states and permitted state
transitions causes similar problems for the evaluator - it is hard and in general not
unambiguous to decide whether the implemented security functions are sufficient to
ensure the specified secure states and permitted state transitions. Based on a formal
specification of the system, it can be formally proven that the specification and later the
implementation conform to the formal specification of the secure states and permitted
state transitions.
41 The Common Criteria defines formal security models in the following way: “A formal security model is a
precise formal presentation of the important aspects of security and their relationship to the behaviour of the
TOE; it identifies the set of rules and practises that regulate how the TSF manages, protects, and otherwise
controls the system resources. [   the formal security policy model is merely a formal representation of the set
of SFRs being claimed.” [CC06 
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To our knowledge, no formal IT security model is available which completely covers the
superior security objective of a secure remote electronic election. Caused by the
numerous different tasks of a remote electronic voting system, the existence of such a
model also seems to be unrealistic. However, the integrity model of Clark Wilson
[CW87  and the confidentiality model of Bell-LaPadula [BLP73  can possibly describe
partial security objectives.
The Clark Wilson model introduced the separation of duty principle to security
modelling. For different partial security objectives in the context of a remote electronic
voting system, it might be possible to use the separation of responsibilities in the sense
of Clark Wilson. The Protection Profile defining basic security requirements for remote
electronic voting systems [PP08  demands, for example:
: The TOE implements an authentication function which
supports the separation of duty principle for at least two members [  . Thus,
at least two poll workers control each other.
This PP security objective corresponds to the certification rule C3 and the penetration
rules E2 and E3, which describe the "internal consistency" of a system in the Clark
Wilson model:
E2: The system has a list mapping users to transaction procedures (user X, TPi,
(CDIa, CDIb, CDIc,  )) and ensures that users can only execute transaction
procedures according to this list.
C3: The allocation list from rule E2 complies with the separation of duty
principle.
E3: The system authenticates the user s identity before executing any
transaction procedure.
The Bell-LaPadula model prevents confidential information flow to public domains.
This is achieved by mandatory access control. This approach could conceivably structure
voters, poll workers, ballots and the ballot box in a hierarchical information flow model
a l  Bell-LaPadula and, thus, to model the secrecy of the vote. These approaches are still
open research tasks.
The following chapters will discuss other security objectives defined in the Protection
Profile, which cannot be modelled with Bell LaPadula, Clark Wilson or none of the other
well-known formal IT security models. Therefore, a new formal IT security model is
developed for these PP security objectives. The developed transaction procedures for the
penetration of these security objectives could be embedded into a superior separation of
duty model according to Clark Wilson. This integration needs to be further analysed in
the context of future work.
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The development of a formal IT security model for remote electronic voting systems is a
complex task and happens gradually by adding security objectives, defined in the
Protection Profile, step by step. The security model, which will be presented in chapter
5, is a first step accomplished for two selected security objectives from the Protection
Profile defining basic security requirements for remote electronic voting [PP08 . This
first step illustrates how the further security objectives can be specified formally. The
two selected security objectives are:
: Only eligible voters who have been unambiguously identified
and authenticated are allowed to cast a vote that is stored in the e-ballot box.
: It is ensured that (A) each voter can cast only one vote
and that (B) no voter loses his voting right without having cast a vote. [ . .
Different possibilities to model a particular system exist. According to [Grimm08  an IT
security model for the above identified security objectives can be described in the
following way:
Execution of a secure, equal,
universal, direct, secret, and free remote electronic election.
A system state is represented by a triple of the following
three entries:
1. W – Set of eligible voters (those who are listed in the electoral register and
have not yet cast a vote).
2. S – Set of (encrypted) votes stored in the e-ballot box.
3. voter: S M – Mapping (encrypted) votes on their electors.
M is a superset of Wtotal, that is, M ⊇ Wtotal. M contains any user who tries to
access the remote electronic voting system, whether or not this particular user
has the right to cast a vote. The function voter assigns each (encrypted) vote
to its producer (voter).
Remark 1: in the case of postal voting, the function voter is realised by the
outer envelope which is labelled with the sender s name and address. During
the tallying phase, the sender information is checked and is verified whether
voter(s) Wtotal or voter(s) M\Wtotal. In the first case, the outer envelope is
removed and the inner one containing the vote is put into the ballot box,
while in the second case the envelope is destroyed.
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Remark 2: the values of voter are visible only for the last vote (or votes) cast
into the e-ballot box, i.e., only for the s Si+1\Si. After anonymising S, the
values of voter cannot be reconstructed. Therefore, in praxis, the voter
mapping should only be used during state transitions on the s Si+1\Si. Secure
state transitions are controllable on this “visible subset” Si+1\Si of Si+1 only
(see rules for permitted state transitions (4) below). For the “invisible part” Si
of the voter mapping on Si+1 we define voteri+1|Si:=voteri.
< Wtotal, S0 {}, voter0 {}  is the initial state.
Wtotal stands for the set of all voters in the electoral register (those who have already cast
a vote and those who still have the right to cast a vote). The two empty sets S0 and voter0
stand for the empty e-ballot-box in the beginning and the corresponding empty mapping
of the empty box on the users of the voting system.
It has to be defined which properties represent a
secure state. According to chapter 4, the PP security objectives O.UnauthVoter and
O.OneVoterOneVote are selected to be specified in terms of formal state properties
denoting a secure state:
that is, the e-ballot box contains
only those e-votes (s S) from which the corresponding elector
(voter(s) Wtotal) is listed in the electoral register. In order to ensure this,
the voter needs to be unambiguously identified and authenticated.
that is,
whenever the set S of cast votes contains two votes from the same voter,
then these two votes are identical. Thus, only one of the stored e-votes is
tallied. This means that each voter can cast only one vote.
that is, a
voter can only become an elector if his e-vote is stored in the e-ballot box
(s S). Thus, he cannot lose his right to vote without having cast a vote
which has been successfully stored in the e-ballot box.
Remark It is easy to prove that these three conditions for a secure state are
equivalent to the following two conditions: “Wtotal=W+voter(S)” (where
“+” denotes the disjoint union of sets) and “The voter mapping is
injective.” An alternative way to prove the security theorem (5) would be
to prove that these two conditions are implied by the permitted state
transitions (4). However, we prefer to derive our three conditions of a
secure state (2) directly from the following permitted state transitions.
The set of assumptions about the environment and the corresponding
reasoning are part of [PP08 .
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A state transition from state Zi=<Wi, Si, voteri   to
Zi+1=<Wi+1, Si+1, voteri+1  is permitted if one of the following rules holds:
State transitions in which no vote is cast:
[rule 1  Wi = Wi+1 Si = S i+1 voteri = voter i+1
State transitions in which a vote is cast and successfully stored in the e-ballot
box, that is, the sets S and W are modified:
[rule 2  s Si+1 : ( voteri+1(s) Wi Wi+1 = Wi \{voteri+1(s)  Si = Si+1\{s  )
Remark 1: All m M can initiate a state transition by casting a vote. However, for
not permitted state transitions holds: m M\Wtotal. Wi+1= Wi and Si+1=Si.
Remark 2: The state transition rules use the voter mapping only on its visible part,
that is, on Si+1\Si. This makes the transition rules usable in praxis.
For all permitted state transitions starting with the initial state,
Z0=<Wtotal, {}, {}  holds that any reachable state is a secure state.
The theorem can be proven by mathematical induction. To simplify our notation,
we write voter instead of voteri+1 or voteri, we understand that voteri+1|Si:=voteri. To
simplify the main proof, it is helpful to first prove that for all permitted state transitions
Z0 to Zi the following three lemmas L1, L2 and L3 hold. These are now named and
proven:
Si Si+1 Wi Wi+1 s Si+1: (Si+1\Si={s  Wi\Wi+1 = {voter(s) )
During each permitted state transition according to [rule 2  exactly
one new vote is generated and exactly the one associated voter loses his right to vote.
In the case Si≠Si+1 ∨ Wi≠Wi+1, [rule 2  had to be applied. Therefore,
there exists an s Si+1 for which holds: Si=Si+1\{s : Thus s is the only element in
Si+1\Si. Therefore, the first part of the lemma is proven. Moreover, according to [rule
2  the following statement holds for this s: voter(s) Wi with Wi+1=Wi\{voter(s) .
Thus, voter(s) is the only element in Wi\Wi+1. Therefore, the second part of the
lemma is proven.
Wtotal = W0 W1 W2   Wi
The set of eligible voters can only decrease.
This lemma is a trivial consequence of [rule 2 .
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∀s ∈ Si : ∃ j < i : voter(s)∈Wj\Wi
For each vote stored in the e-ballot box, there exists a voting right
discarded earlier.
Application of proof by induction over i, starting with i=1:
Induction Base: For i=1: Choose j=0, then this case is equal to the special case of L1
with S1 and S0.
Induction Hypothesis: L3 holds for some i 0
Induction Step: For i+1 holds:
s Si+1 does either hold s Si+1 Si or s Si+1\Si. In the first case the statement is
true according to the induction hypothesis. In the second case, L1 proves the
statement.
Induction Base: All three secure state properties do hold for the initial state Z0
because S0 and Wtotal\W0 are equal to the empty set.
Induction Hypothesis: The secure state property holds for some state Zi; i 0.
Induction Step: It needs to be shown that for all possible states Zi+1 reachable
by permitted state transitions from Zi holds that a secure state is reached:
[rule 1  Wi = Wi+1 Si = Si+1; thus Zi = Zi+1. Therefore, applying the
induction hypothesis it holds that also Zi+1 is a secure state.
[rule 2  s Si+1: (voter(s) Wi Wi+1 = Wi\{voter(s)  Si = Si+1 \{s )
We prove each of the three properties of a secure state separately:
Induction Hypothesis: For some i 0 holds: ∀s∈Si: voter(s) Wtotal
Induction Step: Then for i+1 holds:
s Si+1 : s Si+1 Si ∧ s Si+1\Si.
• Case [s Si+1 Si : this holds because of the induction hypothesis.
• Case [s Si+1\Si : according to L1 holds: Wi\Wi+1={voter(s)  voter(s) Wi
and according to L2 holds: Wi Wtotal, hence voter(s) Wtotal.
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Induction Hypothesis: For some i 0 holds: s,s  Si: voter(s)=voter(s ) s=s 
Induction Step: Then for i+1 holds:
For all s and s  only the following three possibilities exist:
• Case [s, s  Si+1 Si : this holds because of the induction hypothesis.
• Case [s, s  Si+1\Si : according to L1 holds: Si+1\Si={s  s=s 
• Case [s Si+1\Si, s  Si : according to L1 holds: Wi\Wi+1={voter(s) 
voter(s) Wi\Wi+1 and according to L3 holds j < i : voter(s ) Wj\Wi
Thus, voter(s) Wi and voter(s ) Wi. Thus, both values can never be equal.
Thus, the statement holds also in this third case.
Induction Hypothesis: For some i 0 holds: x Wtotal\Wi: s Si: voter(s) = x
Induction Step: Then for i+1 holds: For x Wtotal\Wi+1, x must be in one of the following
sets:
• Case [x (Wtotal\Wi+1) (Wtotal\Wi) : this holds because of the induction
hypothesis.
• Case [x (Wtotal\Wi+1)\(Wtotal\Wi) : according to L2 holds: Wtotal Wi Wi+1.
Thus, (Wtotal\Wi+1)\(Wtotal\Wi) =Wi\Wi+1; thus, x Wi\Wi+1; in addition, it holds:
Wi Wi+1. According to L1 holds Wi\Wi+1={voter(s)  for s Si+1\Si. Then,
deduced from x∈Wi\Wi+1 it holds: voter(s)=x; this completes the proof for i+1.
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Currently, a Protection Profile (PP) defining basic security requirements for remote
electronic voting [PP08  is accomplished in Germany. This PP demands the evaluation
assurance level EAL2+. The current discussions about the evaluation of electronic voting
systems in general illustrate that the critics demand a high EAL level. We agree because
political elections are the highest property of a democracy. Therefore, we believe that
formal methods are well motivated for voting applications. However, concerning an
evaluation according to EAL6 or EAL7 there are still a couple of open questions and
research tasks to solve (not only concerning remote electronic voting). It is necessary to
further discuss the specification of IT security models for remote electronic voting
systems.
This contribution demonstrates with two examples how security objectives, defined by
the basic profile PP can be integrated into a formal IT security model. Up to a complete
formalisation of all security objectives and their integration in a closed IT security model
for remote electronic voting systems, substantial research has to be carried out.
We thank Dieter Hutter for his helpful comments on our formalisation method.
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